



LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS

1918

T78



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013

<http://archive.org/details/chinesepolicyofu00tsut>

CHINESE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
SECRETARYSHIP OF JOHN HAY

BY

TSEH LING TSU

A. B. The University of Nanking, 1914.

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

IN HISTORY

IN

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1918

1918
T78

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

May 27 1918

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY Ise Ping Ise
ENTITLED Chinese Policy of the United States
during the Secretaryship of John Hay
BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts

H. Robertson.

In Charge of Thesis

Samuel W. Larson

Head of Department

Recommendation concurred in*

Committee

on

Final Examination*

*Required for doctor's degree but not for master's

100809

CHINESE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE SECRETARYSHIP OF JOHN HAY.

Contents

Chapter I. Early American Policy in China.

Chapter II. Foreign Aggressions in China and Its Effects
upon America's Chinese Policy.

Chapter III. Hay's Chinese Policy.

Chapter IV. Conclusion.

CHAPTER I.

EARLY AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA.

All intelligent students of the history of America's intercourse with China must be impressed with the fact that the policy followed by the government of the United States in dealing with Chinese questions has passed through two stages in its development. The first stage covered a period of about one hundred years from the arrival of the ship The Empress of China at Canton in 1784 to the proclamation of Secretary Hay's first circular note in 1899. The second stage, opening a new era in the history of American diplomacy in China, began with the twentieth century. It was in this stage that the American government put its Chinese policy into a definite shape and exerted unusual effort to maintain it. With this policy the present paper will deal.

The policy that the United States adopted in its early dealings with China was the traditional foreign policy pronounced by Washington. It was based upon the principle of peaceful commercial relations and the avoidance of entangling alliances. The early American diplomats and consuls in China did what they could in protecting lawful American merchants and citizens in that country. To open China's doors to the world's trade was the aim of the United States which was in common with the European Powers engaged in the Far Eastern trade. To co-operate with them in obtaining the aim not by force but by peaceful means was the policy of the United States. Its attitude towards China was marked with peace and

prudence, and evidently it was passive. But it began to change in the later part of the last century.

The foreign policy of a nation is a thing everchanging. Territorial expansion, commercial and industrial development of the nation or a new international situation to which it must adapt itself often calls for the reshaping of its foreign policy. The annexation of the Hawaiian groups and the Philippine Islands brought the United States into closer relations with the Far East. America's Chinese trade grew to such magnitude and importance that the American government could not but pay constant attention to the interests of the Americans in China which were impaired by other Europeans. All these led to the change of America's policy in China in the closing years of the nineteenth century. The American government could no longer assume the passive attitude. It had to resort to new measures in keeping China's door open, - a door which certain Powers attempted to shut against others.

What were the developments of the affairs in the Far East, especially in China that made the United States change its attitude towards Chinese questions? Why did Secretary Hay announce the policy known by his name? How did he try to carry it out to its fullest extent and to defend it? In order to throw some light upon these questions let us examine the history of America's intercourse with China and those of the general history of the Far East.

Before 1844 there was no treaty relation between China and the United States, all relations being purely commercial. Since the first American vessels arrived at Canton in 1784, American ships visited that port from year to year by way of the Atlantic and

Indian Oceans or by way of Cape Horn. In 1788 the ship Columbia, laden with seal and other skins in the vicinity of Cape Horn, reached the port and there bartered for tea. This was the starting point of the fur trade which later became almost an American monopoly in China. The trade grew so fast that in 1789 there were fifteen American vessels at Canton. Two years later about 427,000¹ seal skins were imported to China where there was always an insatiable market for the fur. "The profits of this trade were very large amounting in successive voyages to one thousand percent every second year."² Yet we must keep in mind that the fur traffic was one of the items of the Chinese trade.

Although the trade was of considerable magnitude, it was under terribly exposed conditions. Many American merchants called the attention of the government to the necessity of better protection. John Jay, secretary for foreign affairs of the Continental Congress, recommended to the Congress on January 20, 1786, that the United States should appoint consuls to the ports in China. Congress consented to his proposal and Mr. Shaw was made consul at Canton. The first American consul to China according to the custom of the time established himself in Macao where all the European representatives to China resided. There he took up the task of protecting American interests. His successors saw the American commerce with China going on without any disturbance until the war of 1812 which

¹ Pitkin, A Statistical View of the United States, p.149 and Appendix VII.

² Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 100.

suspended the trade entirely. When the war was over the trade was resumed and it showed unusual activity. The American government and its representatives in China never failed in affording encouragement and protection to this trade.³

The European Powers and their representatives were equally energetic in protecting their commercial interests in China. However ruptures between the Europeans and the native government spasmodically broke out on account of the exclusive policy of the Manchu government. "The Manchus were on account of the smallness of their number in the midst of the vast empire, compelled to adopt stringent measures to preserve this conquest. For fearing that foreigners should be tempted to snatch their prey from them, they have carefully closed the parts of China, against them, thinking thus to secure themselves from ambitious attempts from without."⁴ Accordingly the Manchu government adhered firmly to its policy of seclusion which was conflicting with the policies of the Powers that sought commercial expansion in the empire. It was the British that first attempted to break down the "Chinese wall". In 1834 the British government sent Lord Napier to China to negotiate a treaty of commerce. The Manchu government refused to open negotiations with him and ordered him to leave Macao. Upon his disregarding this order, the former stopped the British trade with Canton. British warships bombarded the fort near the port. A truce was agreed upon by both the local

³ Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, Vol. I, p. 458.

⁴ Huc, The Chinese Empire, p. 124.

authorities of the city and the British, and the trade was renewed. Lord Napier waited at Macao for further instructions from the home government. A war between China and Great Britain seemed imminent.⁵

Mr. Shillarber was then American consul at Canton. He sent a detailed report of the situation in China to the Department of State, suggesting that the United States might ally herself with Great Britain or take independent action in showing force formidable enough to make the Chinese government concede America's demands as to sharing in whatever privileges might be granted to the British. The United States government did not manifest its attitude towards this proposal because the British did not resort to force against China though the conduct of the Manchu government justified war.

The British did not declare war against China until the Manchu government resolved to stamp out the opium trade. The trade to the British government was a source of revenue. During the five years before the Opium War Great Britain and her Indian possessions had drawn from the Chinese empire thirty to thirty-five millions of dollars in gold and silver and forty to forty-five millions of dollars of teas, raw silk, etc., in exchange for the drug.⁶ The Manchu court sent a commissioner to Canton to see to the abolishment of the trade. The commissioner wrested from the residents at the port upwards of 20,000 chests of opium valued at more than ten millions of dollars.⁷ He caused all the drug to be burned, and it was

⁵ Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, Vol. I, p. 463.

⁶ Doc. No.40, House Ex. Docs. 26th Congress, 1st Sess. Vol. II, 1839-40.

⁷ *ibid.*

spark to tinder. The British government immediately took up arms against China. The war known as the Opium War was brought to an end by the conclusion of peace of Nanking in 1842. The treaty of Nanking was signed on August 29th in the same year. It stipulated that the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foo-chow, Ninpo, and Shanghai were to be opened to foreign trade and residence, that HongKong was ceded to Great Britain, and that future intercourse between the two nations was to be conducted on terms of equality.

The United States did not participate in this war but its representative was shrewd enough to share the fruits of the victory gained by the British. As soon as he learned that the treaty in question would include provisions for new tariff and trade regulations, Commodore Kearny, keeping a squadron on Chinese water during the time of the war, addressed a communication to the governor of Canton, asking that American citizens should enjoy the same privileges as the British, that is to say, the principle of the most-favored-nation clause should be included in the treaty. He received from the local authority the assurance that the United States should have whatever trade concessions which were to be made to Great Britain. He not only asserted America's rights in China but also secured an open door therein for all nations on equal terms. His communication marked the starting point of treaty relations between China and the United States.⁸

The signature of the Treaty of Nanking prompted the American government to take measures for establishing treaty relations

⁸ Johnson, America's Foreign Relation, Vol. I, p. 464.

with China. On December 30, 1842, President Tyler sent a special message to Congress then in session, recommending that a mission was to be dispatched to China to negotiate a treaty of commerce. Congress made an appropriation of \$40,000 for the mission and Caleb Cushing, a representative from Massachusetts, was appointed on March 8, 1845, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China. The commissioner, his secretaries, and attaches, were conveyed to the empire on a squadron of four warships.

The principal objects of this mission were explicitly stated in the letter of instructions prepared by Secretary Webster.⁹ They may be summed up as these: first, the government of the United States did not aim at territorial aggrandizement or aggression; second, it and its representatives in China would not encourage or protect American citizens who were found violating well known laws of China regulating trade; third, it would insist upon intercourse on equal terms; and fourth, a treaty of trade was to be made. "Let it be just. Let there be no unfair advantage on either side."¹⁰ Friendship and justice constituted the spirit of the mission.

Mr. Cushing and his suite arrived at Macao February 24, 1844, and established the American legation in a palace of a former Portuguese governor. He addressed a communication to the viceroy of the two Kwang provinces announcing the intention and purpose of his mission and his desire to deliver the President's letter to the

⁹ Webster's Works, Vol. II, pp. 467, 469.

¹⁰ President's letter to Emperor of China, Senate Doc. 138, 28th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1, 8.

Emperor. In reply the viceroy asked him to stay at Macao and to wait for a commissioner sent by the Peking government to take up the matter of treaty negotiation. The commissioner Tsiyeng arrived at Canton June 16, and five days later opened negotiations with Mr. Cushing at the Portuguese settlement. As a result of the negotiations, a treaty of commerce was signed on July 3. When the main object of the mission was obtained, Mr. Cushing entrusted the President's letter to Tsiyeng and returned to America.¹¹

Throughout the course of his negotiations with the government of China, Mr. Cushing adhered to the principles set forth in Mr. Webster's letter of instructions and to the principle later known as that of equal opportunity. These principles were embodied in the treaty of 1844. In order to see how Mr. Cushing worked out these principles into the treaty let us examine its main provisions.

For the purpose of protecting the American's rights in China the treaty provided that "citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the consul or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States";¹² and that "all questions in regard to rights whether of property or person, arising between citizens of the United States in China, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and regulated by the authority of their own government"¹³ In other words,

¹¹ Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol.V, pp.418,420.

^{12,13} Malloy, Treaties and Conventions between the United States and the other Powers, Vol. I, pp. 187, 202, 203.

in criminal cases the offender was to be disposed of by his own government, while civil cases between the Chinese and the Americans were to be adjusted by the joint action of the Chinese and American authorities. The principle of extraterritoriality had been included in the Treaty of Nanking by the British. Mr. Cushing followed the example, because his conviction was that the United States ought not to concede to any foreign states under any circumstances, jurisdiction over the life and liberty of any citizen of the United States, unless that foreign state be a Christian nation.¹⁴

As an example, I will cite a case during the Chino-Japanese War in order to show how the American government made use of the principle of extraterritoriality. Two Japanese charged as spies were arrested in the French concession in Shanghai. The French consul handed the Japanese over to the American consul and the latter had them kept in the American custody. The Chinese government demanded their surrender. As to this, the American consul asked for instruction from his home government. Secretary Graham thought that these Japanese were not entitled to the extraterritorial privilege and that they should be delivered to the Chinese authorities. These spies were handed over and executed by the Chinese government. Thus we see that the American government did not abuse the privilege secured by Mr. Cushing.

Further than affording protection to Americans' rights in China the American government aimed at the protection of America's lawful commerce in that country. In regard to the opium

¹⁴ Cited in Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 88.

trade, legalized by the treaty of Nanking, the treaty of 1844 provided that "Citizens of the United States who shall attempt to trade in opium or any other contraband articles shall be subject to be dealt with by the Chinese government without being entitled to any countenance or protection from that of the United States"¹⁵ The American government has held this attitude towards that trade up to the present time. In 1858 Mr. Reed was instructed to say to the Chinese government that "the United States would not seek for its citizens the legal establishment of the opium trade nor would it uphold them in any attempt to violate the laws of China by the introduction of that article into the country".¹⁶ By the treaty of 1880 no citizen of the United States was permitted to import opium into any of the open ports of China.¹⁷ In this respect the principle of American diplomacy in China was based upon humanity and it was different from the British policy in China which had mercenary motives behind it.

But the American and the British policies in China had one point in common, that was the idea of equal opportunity. In the supplementary treaty of commerce and navigation concluded between the British and the Chinese governments in the year 1843, the most-favored-nation clause was for the first time introduced. Queen

¹⁵ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions between the United States and the other Powers, Vol. I, p. 202.

¹⁶ Cited in Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 120.

¹⁷ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions between the United States and the other Powers, Vol. I, p. 239.

Victoria held that "equal favor should be shown to the industry and commercial enterprise of all nations"¹⁸ in China. Mr. Cushing agreed with this idea and introduced the most-favored-nation clause in the treaty of 1844.

Twelve years after the signature of the first treaty between the two nations, another treaty was concluded. It was the outcome of the second Anglo-Chinese war. About the year 1854 the British government wished to have the Treaty of Nanking revised but the Manchu government refused to take up the matter of the revision of the treaty with the British commissioner. The British government at last appealed to force in order to bring the Manchu government to terms and declared war upon China in 1856 on the ground that the English flag was insulted in the incident of the Arrow lorcha. The British captured Canton and got ready for a campaign to the north of China. France joined Great Britain.

Dr. Parker, the American representative in China, was in favor of the coercive measure of the English and the French but the policy of his home government was peaceful. Secretary Marcy instructed him that "The British government evidently have objects beyond those contemplated by the United States and we ought not be drawn along with it however anxious it may be for our co-operation",¹⁹ and the United States would rather have its representative and naval officer in China to do what was required for

¹⁸ Victoria's speech quoted by Mr. Cushing cited in Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. V, p. 418.

¹⁹ Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 422.

the defense of American citizens and the protection of their property without being included in the British quarrel or producing any serious disturbance in its amicable relations with China.²⁰ Such was the nature of American policy in China at the time of the second Anglo-Chinese War. Since this policy was not in accordance with Parker's views he resigned. Mr. Reed succeeded him as minister to China in 1857.

Mr. Reed was instructed that he should aid his English and French colleagues to attain the object of the revision of the treaties signed after the Opium War. He was to co-operate peacefully with his colleagues because his home government held that the United States was not at war with the government of China nor did it seek any other purpose than those of lawful commerce and the protection of the lives and property of its citizens.²¹ Clinging to this policy he withheld from any hostile action against China.

The allied forces of Great Britain and France pushed their way to Tien Tsien and the Manchu government was impelled to open negotiations concerning the revision of the treaties. There Mr. Reed went and entered upon negotiations with the Chinese commissioners as to the revision of the Treaty of 1844. As a result, Reed's Treaty was concluded between China and the United States at the same time that treaties between China and Russia, France and Great Britain were signed. The general features of Reed's Treaty were similar to the other four treaties. The treaty consisted of

²⁰ Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p.230.

²¹ Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 424.

concessions: (1) as to diplomatic privileges such as residence of American minister at Peking and direct access to the imperial government through Chung-ti-Yamen; (2) as to privileges of trade and travel; and (3) as to religious toleration on Chinese Christians.

When the Manchu government was humiliated to yield to these demands of the foreigners, it was engaged in quelling a rebellion rising from within. The rebellion known as Tai Ping rebellion aroused in one way or another the interests of the United States. The leader of the rebellion Hung Hsiu Chuan knew an American missionary in Canton, the Rev. J. J. Roberts, and got from him some ideas of Christianity. The corruption of the Manchu government and the bread riot resulting from a famine encouraged him to start a gigantic movement against the existing dynasty. The Tai Pings for a time seemed to be able to overthrow the Manchu government. The American government instructed Mr. McLane, its commissioner to China, that "Should the revolutionary movement now in progress in China be successful and the political power of the country pass into other hands, you will, at your discretion, recognize the government de facto and treat it as the existing government of the country".²² He did investigate the insurgent court at Nanking and found nothing promising in it. Therefore he did not give the Tai Pings any political recognition. Later on the American ministers to China joined their European colleagues in the policy of protecting the treaty ports against the invasion of the Tai Pings.

²² Senate Ex. Doc. 39, 36 Cong., 1st Sess.

An American gentleman, Mr. Frederick T. Ward, organized a Chinese army under command of European officers and fought against the Tai Pings. The army was later known as "Ever Victory Army" and played a considerable part in repressing the rebellion.²³

In the year 1861, when the rebellion was at its zenith, Anson Burlingame was commissioned to China. With a view of familiarizing himself with the general condition of the Europeans and the state of the American interests in China, he spent a few months in visiting the ports in the empire. Then he advanced northward and installed himself in the American legation in Peking which was opened to diplomatic residence in accordance with the conventions secured by the British and the French one year before. He came into contact with Prince Kung, then the head of the Board of Foreign Affairs, called Chung-li-yamen, already referred to elsewhere, and won his confidence. With frankness and sincerity he attracted his European colleagues. Thus his career in China made an auspicious beginning.

A review of his correspondence with his home government will reveal the principle of his action when in China. On the way to Peking he wrote to Secretary Seward saying "If the treaty powers could agree among themselves to the neutrality of China and together secure order in the treaty ports and give their moral support to that party in China in favor of order, the interests of humanity would be subserved".²⁴ It is very plain that his policy was to

²³ Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, Vol. I, p. 473.

²⁴ Diplomatic Correspondence 1864, Part I, p. 859.

secure co-operation among the representatives of the Powers in China, and he was successful at this point.

He succeeded in bringing these representatives to agree upon his policy which was stated in his letter to Mr. Seward on June 20, 1863. This policy was "that while we claim our treaty rights to buy and sell and hire in the treaty ports, subject in respect to our rights of property and person to the jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for nor take concessions of territory of the Chinese government over its own people nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire".²⁵ It follows that this policy was to maintain the territorial integrity of China by means of co-operation among the Powers in China.

The British and French ministers pledged themselves to this policy. The Russian minister to China, Mr. Balluzick, announced that the Russian government did not desire to menace the territorial integrity of China but wished to bring China into the family of nations.²⁶ No matter what real motives might be behind these ministers' diplomacy Mr. Burlingame's task was to work for the realization of his policy. He protested against the claim made by the French consul at Ninpo to acquire the concession of a part of the city for the French government and succeeded in making the French minister have his consul withdraw his claim. He obtained from the British minister, Mr. Brace, a circular to the British consuls defining British jurisdiction over the leased territory to China.²⁷ He in such fashion carried out his policy.

²⁵ Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, p. 859. Cited in Williams, Anson Burlingame, p. 250.

²⁶ F. W. Williams, Anson Burlingame, p. 253.

²⁷ U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, Part I, p. 851. Cited in Williams, Anson Burlingame, p. 256.

Noticing his friendly and impartial attitude towards China, the Peking government could not but regard him as a true friend. When he was about to return to America in 1867, the Emperor of China made him envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of China to the treaty powers. The object of this mission was to persuade the Powers to abandon the policy of force, to treat China on an equality with other nations, and to let her work out the system of reform in her own way and time. Mr. Burlingame accepted the commission on the ground that "when the oldest nation in the world containing one third of the human race, for the first time seeks to come into relation with the west and requests the youngest nation through its representative, to act as the medium of such change, the mission is not one to be solicited or rejected".²⁸

When the Chinese commissioner and his associates²⁹ arrived at Washington, the President and Congress honoured them with dinners. It was on this occasion that Secretary Seward suggested that the American convention of 1858 might be amended with the two purposes: (1) of adopting Mr. Burlingame's policy of more liberal treatment of China and (2) of securing a plentiful supply of Chinese labor for the western states where Chinese laborers were welcome by American capitalists. Burlingame favorably accepted Seward's suggestion and concluded a treaty between China and the United

²⁸ Burlingame's letter to Seward cited in F. W. Williams, Anson Burlingame, p.340.

²⁹ British - one
French - one
Chinese - two.

States. The treaty was signed on July 28, 1868, and proclaimed by the United States government in 1870. Then as the Chinese commissioner he proceeded to London, Paris, and Berlin. At these courts he spoke for China in such a manner that attentive hearings were time and again accorded to him.

Upon his arrival at St. Petersburg he fell ill and passed away, thus bringing the Chinese mission to an end. China lost a real friend, a friend in need at the time when most of the foreigners in the country were affected with anti-Chinese prejudice. She lost a friend who desired that her autonomy might be preserved; that her independence might be secured; that she might have equality and dispense equal privileges to all nations.³⁰ All these desires were expressed in the treaty³¹ he concluded for China with the United States.

The most important feature of this treaty is the stipulation regarding voluntary emigration. Article V reads thus "the United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other for purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The high contracting parties therefore join in reprobating

³⁰ Burlingame's speech given at a banquet in New York City, cited Anson Burlingame, p. 137.

³¹ For China's autonomy see Article I of Burliname treaty, Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers, Vol. I, p. 233.

any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these purposes, they consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offense for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any other foreign country or for a Chinese subject or the citizen of the United States to take a citizen of the United States to China or to any other foreign country without their full and voluntary consent respectively."³² This stipulation had in view two things: (1) free emigration and (2) the prohibition of the so-called coolie trade.

The coolie trade in the eye of American statesmen was scarcely less excusable than the African slave trade. The American government regarded the trade as an inhumane practice. Dr. Parker when American minister to China issued a notice warning American vessels from engaging in the transportation of Chinese coolies to Peru, Cuba, and other places. In 1862 Congress passed a law prohibiting American vessels to carry Chinese to foreign ports to be held as coolies and forbidding American citizens to engage in the trade or to build vessels for the trade. American naval officers were authorized to seize any American vessel that was found carrying Chinese coolies. American consuls at the ports of China were to examine emigrants on ships bound for the United States and to see whether they departed voluntarily.³³

³² Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers, Vol. I, p.235.

³³ Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p.281.

On the other hand the United States encouraged voluntary Chinese immigrants. When the Burlingame treaty was concluded the favorable attitude of western states towards Chinese laborers was at its height because of the efficiency and cheapness of the latter. In 1870 there were more than fifty thousand Chinese employed on the western section of the Pacific Railway. Cheapness accounted for the welcome of Chinese laborers by the Americans at the beginning and it was the main cause that labor unions started agitations against their Chinese competitors afterwards. The revulsion of America's public sentiment toward Chinese labor led to the treaties concluded between the United States and China in the years 1888 and 1894. These treaties practically nullified the free emigration stipulation of the Burlingame treaty. In this respect one can not help agreeing with Prof. Mayo Smith in saying that "As a matter of fact it does not appear that the Burlingame treaty changed the actual condition of things very much".⁵⁴

During the period between the signature of the Burlingame treaty and the appearance of Secretary Hay's first circular note most of America's dealings with China were those concerning the Chinese in the United States. It was engrossed in its internal development. Since Caleb Cushing set forth the principle of equal opportunity and Anson Burlingame added the principle of maintenance of territorial integrity of China, the American policy remained intact until the purchase of Alaska and the annexation of the

⁵⁴ Cited in Williams, Anson Burlingame, p. 159.

Hawaiin and Philippine islands changed America's position on the Pacific and the policies of the Powers created a new situation in China. Then the interests of the American government in Chinese questions revived and its policy was reaffirmed. These topics will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS IN CHINA AND THEIR EFFECT
UPON AMERICA'S CHINESE POLICY.

That the Chinese policy of the United States during the last decade especially the last lustrum of the nineteenth century was the outcome of the international complication in China is an established fact. The entangling situation developed in the most important period of China's relations with the Powers was due to two main factors: firstly, China's weakness invited in foreign encroachment, and secondly, the jarring interests of the Powers gave rise to their conflicting policies in the Chinese Empire. To meet this situation the government of the United States advanced its Chinese policy. In order to appreciate its inwardness, it is necessary for us to know something about China's position and the relative positions of the Powers in that country during the later part of the last century.

As a result of long isolation China was far behind those Powers with which she came into contact. Her troops were not well disciplined nor were they efficiently equipped. Until the late eighties of the nineteenth century she had no arsenals nor a navy. She could not protect her coast line if her enemy attempted to attack it. Moreover the Manchu government, a combination of the Mandarin bureaucracy and the Manchu monarchy was self-sufficient, corrupt, and unprogressive. Under such conditions it is no wonder that China was a field for foreign expansion.

The occupation of Hongkong by the British marked the beginning of foreign encroachment on the Chinese Empire. The British

took the island not only for the purpose of having an entrepot of trade but also a place of armes. Lord Derby said "We occupy Hong-Kong not with the object of colonizing but of using it from a military point of view!"¹ The possession of the island by the British secured Great Britain a unique position in China. With the exception of the Russians in North China, no other Power had a position in China so commanding as that of Great Britain.

She was not contented with it and fixed her covetous eyes upon the south-western frontier of China. Having obtained her supremacy in India she would from thence extend her influence into western China, the upper Yangtze valley, through Burma. In 1874 a British expedition set out to explore the Upper Yangtze region, penetrated as far as Mouninse, and was checked there. Six years later another expedition explored that region and a member of this expedition, Mr. Margary, was murdered by the natives. Profiting by the death the British minister at Peking extracted the Chefoo convention from the Peking government granting the British the right of sending an expedition from Peking through Kansu and Kokonor or by way of Szechulen to Tibet and thence to India. The British did carry it out. The British government gradually realized its designs on Tibet.

While the British were establishing influences in the South and West of China, the Russians were pushing their way into

¹ Cited in Colquhoun, China in Transformation, p. 304.

the north of the Chinese Empire. Russia's occupation of the Amur province placed her in juxtaposition with the eastern border of China. By the treaty of Peking in 1860 Russia got possession of the maritime province of Manchuria with the fine harbor of Vladivostock. She annexed the Kuldja district in the west of China. In the year 1882 the Moscovite government decided to build the trans-Siberian railway and a few years later (1896) it secured permission from the Manchu government to link the trans-Siberian railway with Vladivostock through Manchuria.²

Meanwhile the French did not remain inactive. In 1861 France annexed Cochinchina. From this foothold, French expansion in the Indo-China peninsula went forward in all directions. By 1882 the French government began to struggle with the government of China for suzerainty over Annam. The strife finally resulted in the Franco-Chinese war which was closed by the treaty of 1885. By this treaty the government of China recognized France's sovereignty over Cochinchina and her protectorate over Cambodia and Annam.³

During the first period of foreign aggression upon China - a period of about fifty years from the Opium War to the Chino-Japanese War - the Powers encroached upon the fringe of Chinese territory. Even Japan, a little island empire, once a pupil of China, participated in the spoliation of the Chinese Empire. Her

² Ross, The Russo-Japanese War, p. 20.

NOTE: By this route through Chinese territory the length of the railway between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok would be shortened some 500 miles and the period required for its completion, proportionately decreased.

³ Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, Vol. II, p. 569.

aggressive action will be discussed later in connection with the Chino-Japanese War.

Let us see what development of America's relations with the Far East took place during the latter part of this period. In 1867 the United States purchased Alaska, the Russian possession in North America directly opposite to Manchuria. The possession of that region by the United States extended the base of American commerce with China. "To unite the East of Asia with the West of America is the aspiration of commerce now."⁴ Furthermore, the completion of the Pacific Railway in 1869 secured the United States an important position in the commerce between the Pacific Coast and China. Although it had no foothold on the Pacific or on Chinese soil, the development of affairs evidently pointed to the direction that it could not hold aloof of Chinese questions. When the China-Japanese War broke out in 1894-1895, the government of the United States did a good deal service for the belligerents.

This war was the natural result of Japan's aggressive policy concerning the possession of China. In 1874 Japan seized the Liu Kiu archipelago and then turned her covetous eyes upon Formosa and Korea. In 1876 she recognized Korea as an independent kingdom. But the government of China would not give up its claims to sovereignty over Korea because for thousands of years the latter had been under a Chinese protectorate. When China sent troops to Korea to reassert the claim, the Japanese government seized the Korean king, who had invited the Chinese troops, and prepared for

⁴ Charles Sumner, cited in Hart, American History told by contemporaries, Vol. IV, p. 547.

war with China. The details of the war known as the Chino-Japanese War do not concern us directly; it will suffice to notice the diplomatic activities of the Powers interested in the War and especially the attitude of the United States towards this conflict.

The American government held that the deplorable war between China and Japan would in no way endanger American policy in Asia. It declared that the United States would maintain impartial and friendly neutrality. Throughout the course of the war the American diplomatic and consular representatives in the countries involved in the war at the request of the combatant governments extended their good offices to the Chinese in Japan and to the Japanese in China respectively. The ministers were instructed that their function was personal and unofficial and that they should do what they could consistently with international law and America's position as a neutral for the protection of the Chinese residents and their interests in Japan and of the Japanese in China.⁵ The service was discharged cheerfully and with considerable difficulty and to the satisfaction of the belligerents.

A few days after the declaration of war, Great Britain, Germany, France and Russia contemplated to intervene in the hostilities between China and Japan upon the basis that Korea's independence was to be guaranteed by the Powers and Japan was to receive an indemnity for the war expense from the Chinese government. The British ambassador in Washington waited upon Secretary Gresham to ascertain whether the United States would join Great

⁵ Mr. Gresham to Mr. Dun Foreign Relation of the United States, 1894, pp. 372, 373.

Britain in the proposed intervention. Mr. Gresham replied that "the President earnestly desires that China and Japan shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both and not humiliating to Korea, he can not join England, Germany, Russia and France in an intervention as required".⁶

Although the government of the United States declined to co-operate with the Powers in the contemplated intervention of the war between China and Japan, it made a separate effort to mediate between these nations. Mr. Dun, the American minister at Tokyo, was directed by his home government to approach the Japanese government with a view of ascertaining whether a tender of the President's good offices in the interests of a peace alike honorable to both nations would be acceptable to the government at Tokyo.⁷ The offer of meditation was rejected by the Japanese government because it did not feel disposed to entertain an overture of peace at the time when it had not pressed its victories far enough for the advancement of severe demands.

The Japanese gained one battle after another over the Chinese. In the early spring of 1895 the Japanese troops pushed their way to the Liaotung peninsula, captured Port Arthur and Talienwan and seized the naval base of Weihaiwei. Then the Japanese government made its intention for peace known to the Peking government through the American ministers at Tokyo and Peking.

⁶ Foreign Relation of the United States, 1894, p. 325.

⁷ Mr. Gresham to Mr. Dun Nov. 16, 1894, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, p. 345.

Through the mediation of the American diplomatic representatives negotiations for a peace were opened. The result was the treaty of Shemonoseki, signed on the 17th of April (1895). By that treaty the complete independence of Korea was recognized by the government of China, and the Liaotung peninsula and Formosa were ceded to Japan.

Six days after the signature of the treaty the Russian, German and French governments addressed a joint note to the Chinese government protesting against the cession of the Liaotung peninsula on the ground that it would threaten the safety of their interests in that quarter of the Chinese Empire. At the same time they advised Japan to relinquish her conquests on the mainland. She reluctantly withdrew her demands on the mainland and agreed to receive in return an additional indemnity. Thus Russia deprived Japan of her fruits of victory.⁸ What was the motive of the Russian government in doing this?

The explanation is not hard to find. The Russian government's century-old ambition was to obtain an ice free outlet in the Far East. Vladivostok was not ice free all the winter but Port Arthur was. Had the Russian government not torn up the treaty of Shemonoseki, it could not have had its desire for an ice-free harbor in the Far East satisfied. It took the initiative in demanding the revision of the treaty because it wished to preserve Port Arthur for itself. By the Carsini agreement which

⁸ Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. Vol. II, p. 566.

the Russian government made with the government of China in 1896, the former obtained from the latter a concession for the construction of a railway through Manchuria thus connecting the trans-Siberian railway with Port Arthur and the lease of Kiao-chow to Russia for fifteen years.

Being alarmed by Russia's aggressive policy and prompted by selfish motives⁹ Germany at once resorted to drastic measures, disregarding international comity. Before 1895 Germany had not played any prominent role in Far Eastern politics. But now she resolved to distinguish herself and to single herself out of the rest of the Powers by an act unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy. Upon the murder of two missionaries in Shantung Province in November, 1897, German vessels of war anchored off the harbor of Kiao-chow, immediately landed troops, and seized the city of Kiao-chow. Then the German minister took up negotiations with the Chinese government. As a result a convention was concluded. "A zone of 50 kilometers surrounding the Bay of Kiao-chow at high water"¹⁰ was ceded to Germany. The Chinese government also ceded to "Germany on lease provisionally for ninety-nine years both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chow".¹¹ Kiao-chow was declared a free port on September 2, 1898.¹² Germany's mailed fist set the evil ball a rolling. Her high-handed measure marked the opening of the second

⁹ NOTE: For Germany's motive for seizing the city, see Mr. Denby's report For. Rel. of the U.S., 1898, pp. 187, 189.

^{10,11} Das Staatsarchiv, vol. 61, No. 11518. Cited in Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 473.

¹² Cited in Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 474.

period of fierce land-scrambling by the Powers in China.

As soon as the German question was settled the Russian government complained to the Chinese government that the cession of Kiao-chow to Germany disturbed the political status quo in the Far East and that Russian interests in this quarter were affected adversely. On the 18th of December Russian war ships occupied Port Arthur and impelled the Chinese government to lease the port and Talienwan with adjacent waters, for twenty-five years, subject to prolongation by mutual agreement.¹³ The Russians, like the Germans, declared Talienwan to be a free port but closed Port Arthur to other nations. Now the world saw the reason why Russia two years earlier interfered with the Shimonoseki treaty.

The gains of Germany and Russia were not without effect upon the French government. It demanded and secured the cession of Kwangchau Bay on the same terms as Kiao-chow had been ceded to Germany.¹⁴ Kwangchau Wan, situated in the district of Keichow, Kwangtung Province served as a halfway station between the extreme East and Indo-China.

Great Britain watched the action of the Russian, German, and French governments with jealousy and apprehension. Their gains were her grievances. She would not remain a passive spectator. The British government made the Chinese government cede Wei-hai-Wei to Great Britain on the same terms that Port Arthur had been ceded

¹³ For. Rel. of the U. S., vol. 1898, p. 182.

¹⁴ *ibid.* 1898, p. 191.

to Russia. "Wei-hai-wei is an excellent harbor much larger and better than Port Arthur." ¹⁵ The British made Wei-hai-wei "a second or northern Hongkong"¹⁶ - a naval base from which they could keep a watchful eye upon their traditional rivals, the Russians. Furthermore the British government secured the lease of Miao Bay, Deep Bay and the adjacent islands near Hongkong.

As all the Powers except Russia announced that they would make their leased territories in China free ports open to international settlement and trade, their measures did not seem to the American government to menace America's interests in China.¹⁷ But the President of the United States in no case was in sympathy with a power which sought a lease of Chinese territory and instructed the American minister at Peking, Mr. Conger, to assume an absolutely neutral attitude.¹⁸ Had the Powers not taken the measure of marking out the "spheres of influence" which evidently jeopardized America's interests and impaired her treaty rights in China perhaps the government of the United States would not have announced its Chinese policy in 1899.

The immediate cause of Secretary Hay's announcement was the doctrine of "Spheres of influence". Great Britain had the honor of being the leading figure in marking out the "spheres of

¹⁵ Foreign Relation of the United States, 1848, p. 190.

¹⁶ *ibid*, 1898, p. 190.

¹⁷ See President McKinley's message, For. Rel. of the U.S., 1899, appendix p. 18.

¹⁸ Sec. Hay to Mr. Conger tel. March 2, 1899.
China V 649. Cited Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 475.

influence" in the Chinese Empire. In 1898 Great Britain extracted from the Chinese Government a pledge that the Yangtze valley would never be alienated to another Power, thus marking out the vast territories of central China and the richest provinces of the empire as the British sphere of influence. France made the Chinese government promise not to alienate to another Power the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnang, and the island of Hainan. Japan secured a similar promise as regards the province of Fukien. Germany made Shangtung her sphere of influence and Russia would have her sphere of influence include the whole of Manchuria. The Powers took the first opportunity to seize special privileges in China without paying any respect to China's rights or giving any thought to international ethics.

The actions of the land-hungry Powers were not destitute of far-reaching effects. They called forth reactions both from China and the United States. These reactions will be discussed in order.

The reactions on the part of China were of two types, constructive and destructive. The constructive reaction found its expression in the reform movement of 1898. The Emperor of the Manchu dynasty seeing city after city leased to the Powers, the spheres of influence marked in the Empire, and numberless demands granted, was conscious of the helplessness of the government and wished to carry out reforms suggested by a few enthusiastic but inexperienced Chinese scholars. The well-intentioned Emperor met obstacles of great resisting force. There was a group of Manchus and Chinese who were enemies to the new order and western civilization. The Empress dowager was at the head of the conservative

and reactionary party. She took over the reins of government from the Emperor, whom she practically imprisoned, and had six of the reformers executed. The leaders of the revolutionary movement managed to flee to Japan. Thus a coup d' etat was affected with the slightest disturbance. This coup d' etat sealed for the time being the doom of the peaceful regeneration of China by means of reforms and inaugurated the anti-foreign movement which culminated in the Boxer Uprising. After the reform movement failed, the conservative party in power resolved to stamp out foreign influence in China by force.

The reactions on the part of the United States can be better appreciated in the light of the new development of America's position in the Pacific basin. As early as 1893 the question of annexation of Hawaii to the American Union was brought before the American government by the new government of the Hawaiian Republic.¹⁹ The question was not settled until after the close of the Spanish War. From the military point of view the annexation seemed necessary. In July, 1898, Congress by joint resolution passed the bill that the Hawaiian islands were to be incorporated into the American Union.²⁰ At the close of the Spanish War, Spain ceded the Philippine islands to the United States. These two momentous events, the annexation of Hawaii and the cession of the Philippine group to the United States changed its relations with the Far East. The Americans began to realize that the future prosperity of the United

¹⁹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1894, appendix p. 645.

²⁰ Hart, The American Nation: A History, vol. 25, pp. 138, 139.

States was to be sought in the Asiatic trade and by having these islands as stepping stones to the Far East and as bases for commercial operation the Americans were in a position to compete with other nations in commerce and industries in China.

Yet the policies of the Powers in China darkened the prospect of America's commercial development in that country. They claimed the enjoyment of special privileges in their own "spheres". They might at any time carry out new measures of exclusion so that their own capitalists would be under conditions more favorable and that other nations could not compete with them. If such measures had been carried out American capitalists would have suffered the most because the United States had no sphere of influence in China wherein they could enjoy special privileges. That meant that China would no longer be a market for American products. At such a critical moment the government of the United States could not be a spectator but became an actor in the scene. In September, 1899, Secretary Hay addressed circular notes to all the Powers having interests in China, requesting each of them to declare substantially to the following effect.

"First. That each will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China.

"Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within such 'sphere of interest' (unless they be free ports), no matter to what nationality it may belong and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government.

"Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such sphere, than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality and no higher railroad charge over lines built, controlled or operated within such sphere on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances"²¹

On the surface this note was merely economical but in fact it was political. It performed a two-fold function. On the one hand it aimed at the protection of America's interests in China and on the other hand it aimed to prevent the Powers from taking a further step towards exclusive economic domination in their own spheres, thus preventing them from carrying out the plan of the political absorption of the spheres. As Secretary Hay knew that there was a conflict between the Powers and no agreement had yet been entered upon by them as to what should be done with China, he approached them separately with his notes. Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy - one after the other received a note. Accordingly each government was to give reply separately. From the replies we can see what these Powers thought of the propositions set forth by the famous American diplomat.

Great Britain declared in her reply to the United States that the British government had no intention or desire to depart

²¹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1899, p. 129.

from its traditional policy of securing equal opportunity for the subjects and citizens of all nations in regard to commercial enterprise in China and that it would apply the three principles forwarded by the American government to "all the leased territories of Wei-hai-wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise and all spheres of interests now held or that may hereafter be held by her in China, provided similar declaration is made by other powers concerned."²²

Germany's answer to the United States said that the German government "practically carried out to the fullest extent in its Chinese possessions absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation and commerce;"²³ and that it "entertains no thought of departing in the future from this principle so long as it is not forced to do so, on account of consideration of reciprocity by a divergence from it by other governments"²⁴ and that it was "readt to participate with the United States and the other powers in an agreement made upon these lines by which the same rights are reciprocally secured."²⁵

The Russian government in its usual involved diplomatic reply declared that in so far as its leased territory in China was concerned, it had followed the policy of an open door "by creating Dalienwan a free port" and "if at some future time that port although remaining free itself should be separated by customs limits

²² For. Rel. of the U. S., 1899, pp. 357, 136.

²³, ²⁴, ²⁵ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1899, p. 131.

from other portions of the territory in question, the customs duties would be levied in the zone subject to the tariff upon all foreign merchandise without distinction as to the nationality"²⁶, that Russia had no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of other foreigners in the ports opened or to be opened to foreign commerce by China, and that the question of customs duties belonged to China.²⁷

The government of the United States also received from the French and Japanese governments favorable replies with the natural reservations.²⁸ It did not receive a final reply from the Italian government until Mr. Draper, the American ambassador to Italy, approached that government with the declarations of all the other governments. The Italian government then declared that it would adhere willingly to the propositions announced by the American government.²⁹

Thus Secretary Hay with diplomatic strategy of a high order obtained from each of the Powers a formal assurance of its adherence to his enlightened principles. In order to make the Powers commit themselves to their pledge to maintain the open door policy he went one step further. On March 20, 1900, he instructed the American ambassadors at London, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Rome and the American minister at Tokyo to inform the

26, 27 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1899, pp. 141, 142.

28 For France's reply see For. Rel. of the U.S., 1899, pp. 128, 129. For Japan's reply see *ibid.* p. 139.

29 For the reply see *ibid.* p. 139.

governments to which they were accredited that the condition ³⁰ originally attached to the acceptance of the declaration suggested by the United States had been complied with and the American government would therefore consider the assent given by the government to the acceptance of the proposals of the American government "as final and definite".³¹ Thus the subtle and direct American diplomat brought the negotiations to a triumphant termination.

Thus far I have shown how the partition of commercial and industrial interests in the Chinese Empire by the Powers called forth Hay's Chinese policy. It remains for me to point out how Mr. Hay carried out and maintained the policy during its trying period, the first lustrum of the present century.

³⁰ See Supra p. 35, words underlined.
Also p. 36, " "

³¹ H. Doc. 547, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.

CHAPTER III.

HAY'S CHINESE POLICY.

In the preceding chapter we have noticed that the scrambling policy of the land-greedy powers, caused by mutual fears and jealousies, called forth reaction from China, the reform movement. Now we will turn to another phase of China's reaction to the encroachment of the Powers upon the Chinese Empire. Their atrocious actions made so profound an impression upon the minds of the Chinese people that they regarded all the Powers as nothing more or less than land grabbers. This anti-foreign feeling, manifested itself at first in mob movements against Chinese Christians, finally developed into a general anti-foreign movement known as the Boxer Uprising. The land-greedy Powers had a great share in creating the antagonism of the Chinese to foreigners. "Western injustice toward the East is the cause of much of the Eastern hatred of the West".¹

The Boxer Uprising had its storm-center in the province of Shangtung. Up to the fall of 1897 this province wherein there were more missionaries than any other province was popular for its treatment of foreigners. How came it about that the people of Shangtung turned out to be truculent haters of foreigners? The answer is not hard to seek. It was the seizure of Kiao-chow by the Germans that worked an ominous change in the attitude of the people toward foreigners. It was the Germans who burned down two villages

¹ G. B. Smith, Causes of Anti-foreign Feeling in China, North American Review 171 : 184.

in a certain district of Shangtung that inflamed the people to madness.² The fanatic people overwhelmed by their anti-foreign feeling gave vent to their vengeance in slaughtering Roman Catholics, burning churches, and committing other frightful excesses.

It was not a very hard task for the local authorities to nip the anti-foreign movement in the bud. But they were instructed secretly by the Peking government to encourage the movement instead of suppressing it. Since the coup d' etat the reins of government were in the hands of a crew of reactionaries, with the empress dowager as guiding figure. They were drunk with antipathy toward the foreigners, and it was plainly due to the Powers' attitude toward China. "The various Powers cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavors to be the first to seize upon our innermost territories."³ Because of this they resolved to appeal to the last resort for stamping out foreigners, a conduct lacking in tact and judgment. The Peking government regarded the Boxers as patriots whom it instructed local authorities to encourage. The fiendish work of the Boxers was allowed and the Boxers increased in numbers. The diplomatic corps demanded their suppression in vain. The Boxers gradually worked their way like wild-fire to the southern Chihle province and finally reached Peking in June, 1900.

² G. B. Smith, Causes of Anti-foreign Feeling in China, North American Review 171 : 188.

³ Empress Dowager's edict appeared in the Peking Gazette, 1898, cited in the Boxer Rebellion, Clements Paul Henry, p. 625.

When the Boxer outrage was developing in Shangtung the property and lives of American missionaries were in danger and they were endangered indirectly by the Germans. At the request of the missionaries at Che-foo, the government of the United States instructed Mr. Conger, American minister at Peking, to say to the German minister that the government of the United States would expect that the German authorities in Shangtung would see to it that American citizens and particularly American missionaries in that province should receive equal treatment with German missionaries in the matter of necessary protection of life and property.⁴ The reliance upon the Germans for the protection of the Americans in Shangtung showed that at the beginning of the troublous time the American government had not yet formulated a rule for its conduct. Secretary Hay instructed Mr. Conger to do what he could for the protection of American citizens in north China.

When the diplomatic corps was taking measures for the protection of the legations by bringing guards, Mr. Conger reported to the Department of State the state of affairs and asked if he was authorized to concert with the naval authorities on board the U.S.S. Wheeling⁵ measures for the protection of American interests and the American legation in Peking. To this Mr. Hay promptly consented and told him to "Act independently in protection of American interests where practicable and concurrently with representatives of the other

⁴ Sec. Hay to Mr. Conger, April 16, 1900, Foreign Relation of the United States, 1900, p. 118.

⁵ Arrived at Taku April 7, 1900.

powers if necessity arise".⁶ A few days later he communicated with Mr. Conger that "We have no policy in China, except to protect with energy American interests and especially American citizens and the Legation. There must be nothing done which would commit us to future action inconsistent with your standing instructions. There must be no alliance."⁷ Such was the attitude of the United States towards Chinese affairs at the time when the Boxer movement was about to reach its climax.

Meanwhile the admirals of the allied fleet anchoring off Taku were not inactive. They prepared to send a larger force to Peking to strengthen the legation guards. One of the Taku forts opened fire upon the ships which attempted to make a landing. The admirals held a meeting on board the Criturion and made an agreement to attack the Taku forts. But the American admiral Kempff was opposed to any concerted action of a hostile nature. He refused to take part in the hostile action because he was instructed by his government that he should use his force for the protection of American interests and citizens in China not for waging war against her. Moreover, he held that there had been no declaration of war against China and "a hostile demonstration might consolidate the anti-foreign elements and strengthen the Boxers to oppose the relieving column".⁸ However, the vessels of other Powers bombarded

⁶ Hay to Conger June 8, 1900, For. Rel. of the U. S. 1900, p.143.

⁷ Hay to Conger June 10, 1900, For. Rel. of the U. S. 1900, p. 143.

⁸ President McKinley, annual message, Dec.3,1900. For.Rel. of the U.S. 1900, viii.

the Taku forts on June 16th, and after two days' engagement, the forts fell into the hands of the Powers. Then the Manchu government declared war on the Powers and openly supported the Boxers. The Imperial guards joined them. The legations were besieged and "subject from June 21st to July 27th to a storm of shot, shell and fire-crackers".⁹ The Manchu government was at war with the Powers.

But the local or provincial governments followed a course of action entirely different from the government at Peking. The Yangtze valley viceroys Liu Kungyi and Chang Chi Tung, being aware of the fact that the central government was violating national comity and was going to bring disaster to China, formed a league and made a definite pledge to the following effect. "We, the viceroys of the Liang Kiang and Lean Hu provinces, undertake to hold ourselves responsible for the security of foreign life and property within our respective jurisdictions as well as in the province of Chikiang, so long as the treaty Powers do not land troops in either the Yangtze valley or the province of Chikiang."¹⁰ Wu Ting Fang, Chinese minister at Washington, transmitted the telegram containing this pledge to the Department of State. The American government was in sympathy with these viceroys and Secretary Hay assured Mr. Wu that so long as these viceroys could maintain order in the five provinces and would afford protection to the lives and rights of the foreigners therein, the President had no intention of sending any troops into regions

⁹ Conger's report, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 352.

¹⁰ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 273.

where their presence was not necessary.¹¹ The Department of State instructed the American consuls in China to co-operate with the viceroys for the preservation of peace and order. Mr. Goodnow, United States Consul-General at Shanghai, had an interview with Lui Xun Yi discussing the matter.¹²

The development of the seditious movement in Peking went on. The legations had no communications with their respective home governments. The German minister, Baron von Ketteler, was murdered in Peking. The first relief column was checked at Anting and obliged to retreat to Tien Tsien. At this moment, the Yangtze valley viceroys cabled Mr. Wu asking him to inform the United States government that China had no intention whatever of breaking off relations with the Powers and that these viceroys desired that the American government would take the initiative in conferring with the governments of the other Powers urging them to give instructions to the commanders of the allied force at Tien Tsien to refrain from further fighting and to wait until Li Hung Chang arrived at Peking and opened negotiations with the diplomatic representatives of various Powers.¹³ Under conditions in Peking as referred to already, the American government naturally would not agree with the proposition set forth by the Chinese provincial governments.¹⁴

¹¹ Sec. Hay to Mr. Wu, June 22, 1900. For. Rel. of U.S., 1900, p. 274.

¹² For. Rel. of U. S., 1900, p. 252;

¹³ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, pp. 274, 275.

¹⁴ Sec. Hay's note to Wu June 25, 1900, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 275.

The American government, however, began to take a definite step toward the solution of the Chinese question, since it had communicated with these viceroys. On July 3rd Secretary Hay sent to eleven Powers a circular telegram proclaiming the attitude of the American government. The main points are these:

1. The United States would adhere to the policy, initiated by it in the treaty of peace of 1857 with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of the protection of lives and property of the citizens guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the law of nations.

2. The United States proposed to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability, if wrong should be done to American citizens in China.

3. The United States regarded the condition at Peking as one of anarchy, and would remain at peace with the local authorities so long as they used their power in protecting the lives and property of foreigners in China, and it would regard them as representing the Chinese people.

4. The President's object was to act concurrently with the other Powers in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials and citizens in danger and in protecting all American legitimate interests in all parts of China and in aiding to prevent the disturbance from spreading to other parts of the Chinese Empire and to prevent the recurrence of such disorder.

5. The United States aimed at (1) a solution of the problem which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, (2) preservation of Chinese territorial and administrative entity,

(3) protection of all rights granted to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and finally the maintenance of the principle of equal and impartial trade in China.¹⁵

This declaration received general approval from the Powers. Each of them intimated that it intended to adhere to these principles. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Delcasse', announced in the Chamber of Depute that France did not wish for the break-up of China but wished for concerted action on the part of the Powers during the present trouble in China.¹⁶ Lord Salisbury, Premier of Great Britain, expressed his sincere sympathy with the attitude of the United States.¹⁷ Even the Russian government, evidently by working for its ulterior aims in Manchuria, announced that it had "no designs of territorial acquisition in China".¹⁸ Thus the Powers, with the exception of Russia in Manchuria, followed the guiding principles, set out by Secretary Hay, and took concerted action throughout the trying period of the Boxer trouble.

In the second relief expedition the Powers manifested their attitude toward the principles, laid down by Hay. An international force of 18,800 men was finally organized. To this force the United States contributed 2,500 soldiers who came from the Philippines. The international force was under the command of

¹⁵ For Hay's note dated July 3, 1900, see For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 299.

¹⁶ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 317.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p. 313.

¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 304.

Field Marshal Count von Waldersee. On August 4, the allied forces began to move toward Peking. Having defeated the Boxers and the Imperial troops who attempted to check the advance of the allied forces, they reached Peking, stormed and took it on August 13th. Then followed the raising of the siege of the legations, and the looting of the city by the troops of some of the Powers. The city was occupied jointly by them upon a definite understanding among themselves. The last attempt of the Manchu government for the expulsion of the foreigners from China was thus brought to an end.

Now the absorbing question, what should be done with China, invited the attention of every Power. China was in a peculiar situation. The Manchu court had fled to Shansi when the allied forces were near the capital. There was no central government but there was a league of local governments which would represent the Chinese nation. Li Hung Chang was appointed commissioner to negotiate peace with the diplomatic representatives of the Powers. Staring at each other they were at first at a loss as to the next step toward the solution of the Chinese question. Then the German government stepped forward with its proposal for a preliminary condition in peace negotiations. The condition was that the Chinese government should surrender such persons as were determined upon by the diplomatic representatives at Peking as being the leaders and perpetrators of the "crimes committed in Peking against international law"¹⁹. The German government communicated the proposal to the government of other Powers.

¹⁹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 341.

Germany's allies, the Austrian and Italian governments, naturally agreed with the proposal. But the reply of the United States government did not sound agreeable to the Germans. It contained three points: firstly, the Chinese government itself should be allowed to work out the punitive measures, and the United States would not join the demand that the surrender of such persons should be a preliminary condition for diplomatic negotiation with China; secondly, the punishment of the responsible authors of wrongs in all parts in China should be provided for in the negotiation for final settlement; and, thirdly, the United States wished to open negotiations with China at the earliest practical moment with a view of bringing about a preliminary settlement whereby the Chinese government could exercise fully its powers for the preservation of order and for the protection of foreigners in China.²⁰

Following the German proposal, the French government addressed notes to the other Powers, stating its proposals as basis of negotiations with the Chinese government. The proposals were these:

1. The punishment of the principal guilty persons who were to be designated by the representatives at Peking.
2. The continuance of the interdiction against the importation of arms.
3. Equitable indemnities for foreign governments, corporations, and individuals.

²⁰ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 34.

4. The organization in Peking of a permanent guard for the legations.

5. The dismantling of the forts at Taxu.

6. The military occupation of two or three points on the road from Tien Tsiang to Peking.²¹

As to these bases for negotiation, the American government held quite different views. It would not commit itself to a permanent participation in occupation of points on the road between Tien-Tsien and Peking and deemed "it desirable that the Powers should obtain from the Chinese government the assurance of their rights to guard their legations and to have means of unrestricted access to them whenever required".²² By making this reservation, the government of the United States did not mean to present any obstacle to the initiation of negotiations but hoped that it would be found practicable to begin such negotiations at early days.

The French proposals were accepted by the Powers with certain reservations. But negotiations between the Chinese plenipotentiaries and the diplomatic representatives did not begin until the middle of October. During the period between the fall of Peking and the opening of negotiations the members of the diplomatic corps were busy in formulating their demands.

Meanwhile remarkable events developed in Northern China. After the capture of the capital several expeditions of retaliation

²¹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 321.

²² *ibid.* 1900, p. 323.

under the command of von Waldersee were made to Pao-Tingfu and Cheng Tingfu in the province of Chihli. For the purpose of securing peace, Li Hung Chang ordered Chinese troops not to interfere with the excursions upon any account. The incursion troops had done considerable damage to the people of Chihli. The American troops did not participate in these expeditions.

Tien Tsien, as already pointed out elsewhere, had been occupied by the allies since June 23. The city became a strong temptation to the Powers. At last they could no longer control themselves and indulged in struggle for permanent extensions of the concessions which they had established. Russia which had disavowed territorial designs in China, now had the honour of making the first move in a land-grab game on a smaller scale. In early November, the Russian consuls in Tien Tsien announced that the large tract of land on the left bank of the Peh River became the property of the Russian troops by act of war.²³ Then followed Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Japan, each taking a tract of land for the extension of its own concession.²⁴ Only a piece of land, which had been an American concession and abandoned in the year 1896, was left. Mr. Conger regarded Russia's movement as a dangerous precedent,²⁵ when Mr. Rogsdale, American consul at Tien Tsien, reported the Russian announcement to him. He maintained that all action in

²³ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, p. 42.

²⁴ For announcements for the occupation of the lands by the Powers see For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, pp. 46, 47, 52.

²⁵ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, pp. 39, 40.

relation to securing new or extending old concessions should be deferred until a final settlement of the Boxer question was reached and the rights of all nations could be considered. He instructed Mr. Rogsdale to address a protest to the Russian consul but the reply of the latter was evasive. Then he addressed a note to his Russian colleague at Peking demonstrating that "Tien Tsien is an open port and the property under question is needed by and should be reserved for the use of all the Powers. If foreign occupation of it was necessary it should be occupied as an international settlement. Under the present movement of the allied forces in China, there are still stronger reasons why this large tract of land, including an important public railway station and other property necessary for international use should not be appropriated by a single power."²⁶

The Russian minister's reply was very curious. It disclaimed any intention of acquiring territory by conquest, or of taking possession of railway station at Tien Tsien by Russian government. It made a poor evasion by saying "If the communication of Mr. Poppe contains any expressions which could be so constructed they have certainly been erroneously used by him."²⁷ Mr. Conger asked the Russian minister to instruct the Russian consul to have the error corrected but the note had no effect. The same was the case with his protests to the other Powers.

The next step which he took in regard to the matter at Tien Tsien, was to reserve that tract of land formerly the American

²⁶ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, p. 45.

²⁷ *ibid* 1901, p. 45.

concession for the United States concession or "preferably have it included in an international settlement."²⁸ He held that all the foreign settlements at Tien Tsien should be the same as those at Shanghai. He instructed Mr. Ragsdale to communicate with his colleagues at Tien Tsien to the following effect:

"For the purpose of preserving the tract of land known as the United States concession in Tien Tsien, to be with other tracts organized into an international settlement if possible, but if not then at the proper time whenever it may legally be done to be occupied as a United States concession."²⁹

It was too much to hope that any of the Powers which once got hold of territory would let it slip out of its grip. As he realized the attempt of rendering the settlements in Tien Tsien international was impossible, Mr. Conger telegraphed the Department of State urging that it would be advantageous to the United States in many ways to have an American concession at the port. Secretary Hay was fully in accord with his view and instructed him to make a demand upon the Chinese government for the consideration of the rights of the United States to a concession there. When he brought up the question of retrocession of the land before the Chinese government troubles arose. The difficulties were not from the Chinese but from some foreign concerns which were deadly adverse to the restoration of the land to the United States. The Chinese government offered as

²⁸ Conger to Ragsdale, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, p. 51.

²⁹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, p. 51.

a compromise a larger tract of land down the Peh River. Mr. Conger refused to accept the offer but insisted upon the restoration of the old United States concession. He reported to Hay that "Before the affair is concluded we shall hear some strenuous German opposition"³⁰ As Hay did not wish that the Chinese policy of the United States should deviate even slightly from its traditional and newly reaffirmed policy - the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity - he replied, ".... it seems undesirable to press the matter further at present".³¹ Thus the United States remained a landless power in China.

When the "grab game" was played by the Powers in Tien Tsien the peace negotiations dragged along in Peking. As Mr. Conger was allowed leave of absence from his post, Mr. Rockhill³² succeeded him as representative of the American government in the negotiation. He acted independently but harmoniously in the concert of the Powers and exerted a salutary influence in the course of moderation, humanity, and justice.³³ Like Mr. Conger he tried with vigor and prudence to check any measure that might "cripple or impede the ability of China in the maintenance of a stable government and its territorial integrity"³⁴ They strove to control the action of their

³⁰ Conger to Hay, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, pp.55, 56.

³¹ Hay to Conger, Nov. 27, 1901, For. Rel. of the U.S., 1901, pp. 55, 59.

³² W. W Rockhill was appointed commissioner to China June 27, 1900

³³ Rockhill's report to Hay, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1901, appendix.

³⁴ Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 432.

colleagues to that end so that the "open door" policy might not be placed in peril.³⁵

The most complicated question of the peace terms was that of indemnity. It involved two phases, the amount of the indemnities and the manner of paying them, both requiring serious consideration. These questions were settled with difficulty and after much delay. The indemnities were to be paid in a lump sum and the sum total amounted to 45,000,000 taels. The claim of the United States was the lowest, being 32,939,055 taels equivalent to \$24,168,367. The actual losses and military expenses aggregated about \$11,000,000. In 1908 Congress passed a bill authorizing the President to modify the indemnity and to remit the surplus to China as "an act of friendship"³⁶ The remission began on the 1st day of January of 1909.³⁷ The Chinese government has since then used the money thus returned to send Chinese young men to study in American colleges.

The negotiations of ten weary months ultimately reached a conclusion. The final protocol contained twelve articles which may be grouped under four headings as follows: (1) preventive measures against the reoccurrence of anti-foreign movements, (2) the punishment of the leaders of the Boxer movement, (3) the indemnification and (4) improvement of diplomatic and commercial relations between China and the Powers. The protocol or peace agreement

³⁵ Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 433.

³⁶ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1908, p. 4.

³⁷ *ibid* p. 72.

was signed by the diplomatic corps and the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Peking on September 7, 1901. The Powers agreed upon the evacuation of the capital. The American troops were the first to withdraw from the city and those of the other Powers remained a few months after the withdrawal of the United States troops.

One of the important results of the Boxer uprising was the occupation of Manchuria by the Russians. On the 5th of August, 1900, they seized the treaty port of Niu-Chwang and placed it under the civil administration of Russian authorities. They garrisoned some fifty points in the three eastern provinces. The Russian government announced to the other Powers late in August that the military occupation of Manchuria was temporary and that as soon as order in the region was attained, "Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory, provided that the action of the other Powers does not place any obstacle in the way of such a measure".³⁸ The announcement served the purpose of allaying the apprehensions of the other Powers but it committed the Russian government to the evacuation of Manchuria. It became a diplomatic question in the far East during the period from the Boxer insurrection to the Russo-Japanese War.

Before taking up the diplomatic complications involved in this question let us discuss the Anglo-German agreement of which the main aim was to hold Russia's territorial designs on northern China in check. The agreement was signed by the contracting parties on the 16th of October, 1900. The second article of the agreement reads: "The Imperial German Government and Her Britannic Majesty's

³⁸ Parliamentary Papers on China, No.1, 1900.

Government will not on their part make use of the present complication (Boxer Uprising)³⁹ to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions and will direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire."⁴⁰

This agreement strengthened Hay's policy newly reaffirmed in the note of July 3, but it was a blow to Russian ambition in China. Moreover it supported the view of the American government as to the opposition to any plan which contemplated the prolonged occupation of any portion of China.⁴¹

But the agreement and announcement were to Russia nothing more than "scraps of paper". She interpreted the doctrine of concerted action as not applying to her action in Manchuria. Accordingly she appeared on the one hand to be eager for co-operation with the other Powers in sending the expedition to Peking and in peace negotiations but on the other hand she acted independently in the three eastern provinces. She steadily worked for the permanent occupation of these provinces and tried to exclude other nations by various concessions which she extracted from the Chinese government in the years 1901 and 1902. In taking steps toward this end she met with decided opposition from Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. The protests of the former two Powers do not concern

³⁹ Inserted by the writer of this thesis.

⁴⁰ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 354.

⁴¹ Hay to Rockhill. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1900, p. 260.

us directly, let us notice how Secretary Hay proceeded.

In February, 1902, Hay addressed identical notes to eleven powers declaring

"Any agreement by which China cedes to any corporation or company the exclusive right and privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing Manchuria can but be viewed with the gravest concern by the government of the United States of America. It constitutes a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously affects the rights of American citizens; it restricts their rightful trade and exposes it to being discriminated against, interfered with, or otherwise jeopardized, and strongly tends towards permanently impairing the sovereign rights of China in this part of the Empire, and seriously interferes with her ability to meet her international obligations. Furthermore such concessions on the part of China will undoubtedly be followed by demands from other powers for similar and equal exclusive advantages in other parts of the Chinese Empire, and the inevitable result must be the complete wreck of the policy of absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to trade, navigation, and commerce within the confines of the Empire.

"On the other hand, the attainment by one power of such exclusive privileges for a commercial organization of its nationality conflicts with the assurances, repeatedly conveyed to this government by the imperial Russian ministry of foreign affairs of the imperial government's intention to follow the policy of the

open door in China, as advocated by the government of the United States and accepted by all the treaty powers having commercial interests in the Empire.

"It is for these reasons that the government of the United States submits the above to the earnest consideration of the Imperial governments of China and Russia, confident that they will give due weight to its importance and adopt such measures as will relieve that just and natural anxiety of the United States."⁴²

The Russian government tried to evade this by giving the American government the assurance that international rights would be respected. However it was compelled to change its attitude by the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The object of that alliance was to protect the interests of the contracting parties in China and Korea by means of maintaining the territorial integrity of the two nations. The Russian government did not fail to see that there were not a few obstacles in the way of its plan in Manchuria and made an agreement with the Chinese government to carry out the evacuation of the three eastern provinces in the following manner: within six months after the signature of the agreement the Russians were to evacuate the south-western portion of the province of Mukden up to the Liao River; within the following six months, the remainder of Mukden and the province of Kiren; and within the six months following the second withdrawal all the Russian troops were to leave the province of Hielung Chang.

⁴² For. Rel. of the U. S., 1902, p. 926.

In spite of this agreement, the Russian government would not carry out the evacuation without compensation. When the date for the first withdrawal came, it called back the soldiers from their stations and distributed them along the railway lines as guards. In April, 1903, it made demands upon the Chinese government. The most important demands were: firstly, in Manchuria no new treaty ports were to be opened; secondly, no territory in that region was to be alienated to any other power; and thirdly, no new consuls without previous consent of the Russian government should be admitted.⁴³ But these demands were rejected by the Chinese government because the American and British governments warned the latter of the danger of accepting them.

In September, 1903, the Russian minister at Peking approached the Chinese government with the information that Russia would carry out the final evacuation if China would agree upon these conditions: no part of Manchuria was to be alienated to the other Powers; no concession would be made to England without equivalent provisions for Russia; the telegraph lines from Port Arthur and Niu Chwang to Mukden should be left in Russian hands; and there should be no increase in the import tariff on goods entering Manchuria by rail. All these stringent measures for closing Manchuria against the economic enterprise of all foreigners were in direct opposition to the principles laid down by Hay.

The persistent diplomat could not be beaten by such measures. He exerted efforts to put through a treaty of commerce

⁴³ Conger to Hay, April 23, 1903, For. Rel. of the U. S., 1903, pp. 53, 54.

with China. He thought it necessary to open ports in Manchuria to foreign trade in order to beat Russia's policy of exclusion. The treaty of commerce between the United States and China was signed on October 8th, 1903. Its important provisions were: (1) the Chinese government itself agreed to open Mukden, and Antung as places for international residence and trade (Art. XV); (2) citizens of the United States should have the right to carry on in Chinese territory mining operations and other necessary business relating thereto (Art. VIII); and (3) missionary societies of the United States should be permitted to rent and lease in perpetuity, as the property of such societies, building or land in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes (Art. XII).⁴⁴

When the date ⁴⁵ for final evacuation came the Russians were still in occupation of the larger part of Manchuria with the exception of the region outside the Liao River and still in control of Niu Chwang. By the end of October they reoccupied Mukden. It was estimated that the Russian soldiers then in Manchuria amounted to 45,000.⁴⁶ The Russian government showed no intention whatever, to carry out the provisions of the agreement. It became increasingly evident that the Russians would not evacuate Manchuria unless they were driven out.

Now Japan demanded that Russia should live up to her

⁴⁴ For the text of the treaty see For. Rel. of the U.S., 1903, pp. 91, 99.

⁴⁵ Oct. 8, 1903.

⁴⁶ Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 250.

promise. It was not because the Japanese government stood for international justice but because the occupation of Manchuria by the Russians was a menace to Japan's safety. Furthermore Japan had interests in Korea conflicting with those of the Russians therein. In 1896 the Japanese government proposed to the Russian government the partition of Korea, but the proposal was refused.⁴⁷ The Russians established a barrier in north Korea against Japanese political and commercial expansion. The Japanese government had forborne for a few years. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance it was backed up by the British government and thus was in a position to reckon with the Russians. It sent the Russian government a series of proposals as regards the mutual recognition of their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and in Korea. The Russian government refused to come to an understanding with the Japanese government. The latter thereupon broke off diplomatic relations and ordered its fleet to attack Port Arthur on February 8, 1904. On the next day the two countries declared war.

The war, known as the Russo-Japanese War, from the beginning to the end was fought on the Chinese territory which was rendered by the Russian occupation into a state of "double or ambiguous sovereignty"⁴⁸ The problem of maintaining the neutrality and integrity of China became a thorny subject confronting the diplomats of the world, especially Secretary Hay. He adhered to

⁴⁷ Russian Official History of the Russo-Japanese War cited in Ross, Russo-Japanese War, Vol. I, p. 22.

⁴⁸ Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War, p. 250.

his policy of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. He defended it during these troublous times with a view of preserving the integrity and neutrality of China proper and of limiting the area of hostilities. On February 10, 1904, he sent instructions to American representatives at the courts of Russia, China and Japan. The note reads thus:

"You will express to ministers of foregin affairs the earnest desire of this government of the United States that in the course of the military operations which have begun between Russia and Japan the neutrality of China and in all practicable ways her administrative entity shall be respected by both parties, and that the area of hostilities shall be localized and limited as much as possible so that undue excitement and disturbance of the Chinese people may be prevented and the least possible loss to commerce and peaceful intercourse of the world may be occasioned."⁴⁹

At the same time Mr. Hay through the instrumentality of American representatives communicated his ideas to ten European Powers and invited their concurrence. With the exception of Spain, all the Powers gave favorable replies. The three countries concerned, Russia, Japan and China also accepted the principles.

Japan accepted the proposals of the United States with the reservation that "so long as Russia, making a similar engagement, fulfills in good faith the terms and conditions of such engagement."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1904, p. 2.

⁵⁰ *ibid* p. 2.

The acceptance of the proposals by the Russian government was made upon these conditions: (1) neutralization in no case was to be extended to Manchuria; (2) China should observe strict neutrality; (3) Japan should loyally observe the engagement.⁵¹ All the reservations made by the belligerents served as loop-holes by means of which they later escaped from their obligations.

As the war went on Japan won victory after victory over Russia by land and sea. It seemed there was no hope for Russia to retrieve the loss she suffered and furthermore a rebellion threatened her at home. On the other hand Japan was on the point of exhaustion though she tried hard to conceal it. At this psychological moment President Roosevelt approached the belligerents with proposal for peace and the proposal was heartily accepted by them. Negotiations were conducted in America and were closed by the Portsmouth treaty which was signed on September 5, 1905.

The treaty provided for (1) the transfer of Russia's rights in Liao Tung peninsula to Japan, (2) the cession of the southern section of the Manchuria Railway to Japan, and (3) the withdrawal of the Russian and the Japanese troops by their respective governments from Manchuria but the maintenance by them of railway guards. As regards the open door policy, it provided specifically that neither Japan nor Russia should obstruct "any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of commerce and industry of Manchuria".⁵² In addition Russia declared

⁵¹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1904, p. 2.

⁵² See Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, cited in Millard, Our Eastern Question, appendix C.

that she had "not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity".⁵³

Before the conclusion of the Portsmouth treaty a sort of apprehension had existed among the Powers other than the belligerents that in the eventual negotiation for peace between Russia and Japan, claim might have been made for the concession of Chinese territory to the neutral powers.⁵⁴ Secretary Hay communicated to the Powers on January 13, 1905, notes declaring:

"The United States had repeatedly made its position well known and has been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded to its efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad principal policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the Orient whereby equality of commercial opportunity and accesses shall be enjoyed by all nations. Holding these views the United States disclaims any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make this purpose frankly known and to remove all apprehension on this score so far as concerns the policy of this nation....."⁵⁵ All the Powers gave favorable replies to the American government, stating that they would adhere to the policy of the territorial integrity of China

⁵³ See Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, cited in Millard, Our Eastern Question, Appendix C.

⁵⁴ Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 555.

⁵⁵ Ms. Inst. Austria, V.144, cited Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 554, 555.

and the open door in the Orient.

The circular telegram of January 13, 1905, was the last important document that Secretary Hay sent to the Powers reaffirming his Chinese policy and inviting their adherence to it. His sudden death on July 1, 1905, prevented him from doing something more for his policy in China during the negotiations for peace between Russia and Japan which was opened two months after his death. Ever since the announcement of his policy in the second year of his term as secretary, he assumed the leadership in the diplomacy in the Far East. He never failed in getting the Powers to declare their intention to adhere to his policy although certain Powers never lived up to their pledges. In defending his policy during the trying times such as the Boxer uprising and the troubles in Manchuria, it is safe to say, none of his successors has surpassed him in enthusiasm, effort and skill.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSION.

As already pointed out Hay's policy was based upon two principles: first, the open door and equal opportunity; and, second, the territorial integrity of China. The former implies and is practically synonymous to commercial and industrial neutralization, while the latter fundamentally means the maintenance of political equilibrium in the Chinese Empire. If there is any need for an international policy that can harmonize the interests of the Powers in China and that can secure equally favorable conditions under which various nations engaged in the Far Eastern trade can compete with each other, that policy must contain these two essential principles. To promote these purposes, no other policy is better than the Hay policy. Its soundness accounted for the fact that the majority of the powers readily and sincerely accepted it when announced in 1899.

Besides this the success of the Hay policy finds its explanation in the manner in which it was carried out. Simplicity, directness, and openness characterized Hay's diplomatic procedure. At the so-called psychological moment he appealed with his principles first to those nations whose policies in China were in accord with his. Having gotten favorable replies from them, he then communicated his principles, together with the assurances from the Powers, to the power which tended to be antagonistic. The latter therefore could not help to shape its answer so as to appear advocating the policy. Thus Hay succeeded in bringing the Powers concerned to an

agreement upon his proposals whenever he brought them up before various governments. To get support for his policy from the majority of the family of nations, so that the rest could not but conform, was the key note of his procedure.

The immediate results of Hay's negotiations in 1899 were noticeable. In the first place the land-grabbing policy of the Powers was held in check. By declaring that they would not expect to have exclusive rights in their respective spheres of influence, they claimed that they limited the extent of their future demands and that they expressed an intention not to interfere thenceforth with China's sovereign rights. In the second place the commercial world was secured in the enjoyment of all its rights under treaties with China.

During the Boxer uprising Hay's policy announced in the note of July 3, 1900, served as a guiding principle whereby the Powers, except Russia in Manchuria, agreed to take united action. They took concerted action in all measures, such as the relief expedition and peace negotiations. This concurrence on the part of the Powers saved China from dismemberment.

The first lustrum of the present century marked a struggle between Hay's Chinese policy and Russia's policy in Manchuria. Hay's measure to open up Manchuria to the world trade was flatly opposed to the policy of exclusion of the Russian government. His protests and demonstrations kept it busy with denial and explanation and at last exacted from it the convention for the evacuation of Manchuria. Though we can not say that this was solely due to his opposition, we are safe to say that it was one of the factors.

Before 1905 the Russian government was the only opponent of the Hay policy but after the Russo-Japanese war the enemy of the Hay policy increased in number. By the treaty of Portsmouth both Japan and Russia gave formal pledges to respect the integrity of China and the open door. But none of them lived up to the pledges. Russia resumed her old policy in northern Manchuria while Japan in southern Manchuria took up measures as aggressive as that of its predecessor. The two governments seemed to have reached an agreement to break down the Hay principles.

Secretary Root and his successor Knox were earnest defenders of the Hay policy. In 1908 Root protested against Russia's attempt at establishing her control over Northern Manchuria but in vain. When the Russian demands were disclosed in 1909 Knox made an equally earnest protest but it was no more effective than that of his predecessor. In the next year a British and American syndicate secured a concession from the Chinese government to build a railway, known as the Chin-chow Aigun Railway. Secretary Knox proposed to the countries most concerned that the entire railroad system of Manchuria should be brought under an international administration and for purely commercial purposes.¹ He also communicated this idea to Great Britain, Germany and France.² His proposal did not receive warm support from the three Powers and met with emphatic rejection from the Russian and the Japanese governments. Thus the

¹ For. Rel. of the U. S., 1910, p. 234.

² For the correspondence with the Powers see *ibid* pp.234, 269.

attempt at neutralization of Manchurian railways failed.

The reason why the Japanese government was opposed to this arrangement was plain. No sooner than the signature of the Portsmouth treaty, Japan extracted from the Chinese government the secret Komura treaty by which Japan was to enjoy special privileges in railway building and other enterprises in southern Manchuria. Later on the South Manchuria Railway Company was organized as an instrumentality of getting hold of all the railways in that quarter of Manchuria. The semi-governmental concern gave special railway rates to Japanese traders. Such actions were absolutely antagonistic to the principles of equal opportunity and the open door.

Nineteen years ago Hay's declaration together with the assurance of the Powers created a political and economical equilibrium in China. It was disturbed by Japan's seizure of Kiao-Chow in August, 1914. The Japanese government went so far that in May, 1917, it declared that there was no obligation on the part of Japan to return the place to China. It deliberately violated the principle of the preservation of China's integrity.

Further still the Japanese government in 1915 pressed the famous twenty-one demands under five groups upon the Chinese government and forced it to acquiesce to the demands of the first four groups. Japan thus secured direct, explicit special privileges which are distinctly contradictory to the "equal opportunity". She is not yet through with China. Her designs on the latter have been increasing from time to time. Taking advantage of the great war, she has extended her illegitimate ambition as fully as possible while China is struggling for reconstitution and stability. When

the Lansing-Ishii agreement was disclosed last year, apprehension existed among the Chinese that Japan might push her way in China still farther. This she has attempted to do. Late in last month we saw a statement in the Chicago Tribune, saying that Japan had made severe demands upon China. Since the European War broke out, the Japanese government has done what it likes without the slightest regard to the Hay policy. Nay, it has openly violated the policy, initiated by the American government and guaranteed by the leading European Powers.

Is the government of the United States going to let the policy fall into obscurity or to try its best to defend it?

If the United States were an isolated or hermit nation in the West as it was a century ago, the preservation of the Hay policy would mean very little. But it is a world power, a nation of foreign trade. Its growth depends upon the maintenance of foreign trade. The possibilities lying in trade between it and China are certainly great. "China is at the beginning of a commercial development which in its magnitude can not be estimated." If the Americans expect to have the Chinese market open to the export trade of the United States, they should pay special attention to the Hay policy. Its downfall means the loss of a good market for American products.

The United States has developed a consistent policy in China and for about a quarter century has pursued it definitely therein as it has followed the Monroe Doctrine in South America. A policy to a nation is no less important than its sovereignty. The government in upholding and defending its foreign policy is under

the same obligation as in defending the territory. As the United States government never fails to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, there is no reason why it should assume a passive attitude towards the Hay policy. If this government will maintain the prestige of the United States in the Far East, and the weight of its voice in the council of Far Eastern Affairs, it needs scarcely to be told that it should do something positive for its Chinese policy.

Twenty years ago the conflicting policies of the Powers in China threatened a collision among them. Fortunately the Hay policy upon which the Powers agreed removed the sources of international irritation. Russia's departure from the policy destroyed the status quo in the Far East and thus led to the Russo-Japanese War. Since then the Powers, except Japan, have been trying to maintain the balance of Power in the extreme East. But during recent years Japan has disturbed the political equilibrium and she is evidently a menace to the peace of the Far East. If that menace is allowed to exist, it is not unlikely that a great war will be fought by the Powers in the Orient.

A readjustment among the Powers in the Far East seems as necessary as it is in Europe. It is highly desirable that the question of that readjustment will be taken up in the peace conference which sooner or later will close the European War. The writer of the present thesis is quite convinced that unless it is based upon the Hay principles, that readjustment can not restore the political and economical equilibrium, which has been totally disturbed by

Japan, and secure permanent peace to the Far East as well as to the world. Would it not be wise if the government of the United States in that peace conference should exert its influence in bringing the Powers to an agreement upon the enforcement of the Hay policy?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Sources

1. Books and Pamphlets.

- House Executive Documents, 26th Cong.1st Sess., Vols.I & II, 1839-40.
Washington, 1840.
- House Executive Documents, 26th Cong.2nd Sess., Vol. IV, 1840.
Washington, 1841.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1890-97. Washington,1891-98.
- President's Message and Foreign Relations, 1898-1900, Washington,
1891-98.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901-10,Washington 1902-1915.
- British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 92, London, 1904.
- Parliamentary Papers, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899) London, 1899.
- Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XV, China Nos. 1,2,3,4 (1900) London,1900
- Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XCI, China Nos. 2,5,6, (1901) London, 1901
- Parliamentary Papers, Vol. CX, China No. 2 (1904), London, 1904.
- Malloy, W. W., Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United
States of America and the other Powers since
July 4, 1776, Vols. I,II, Washington, 1909.
- Moore, J. B., A Digest of International Law, Vol.5,Washington, 1906.
- Webster, D. Webster's Work (in 18 volumes) National Edition,
Vol. XI, XII, Boston, 1903.

II. Magazine Articles.

- Austin, A.B., "Recent Developments in China"
in the Forum, 27; 730, New York, 1899.
- Beresford, C., "China and the Powers"
North American Review, 168; 530, Boston, 1899.
"British Policy in China"
Spectator, 82; 849, London 1899.
- Crozier, W., "American Troops in the Light of the Peking Expedition".
North American Review, 172; 225, Boston, 1900.
- Dilke, C.W., "American Policy in China"
North American Review, 170, 642, Boston, 1900.
"England and Lord Salisbury's New Policy"
Fortnightly, 74; 227, London, 1903.
- Gundry, R. S., "Sphere of Influence and the Open Door"
Fortnightly, 72; 37 London, 1902.
"Open Door in China".
Outlook, 64; 530, New York, 1900.
- Quincy, J., "The United States in China"
Contemporary, 78; 183, London, 1900.
- Rockhill, W.W., "United States and Future of China"
Forum, 29; 324, New York, 1900.
"Russia and the Open Door"
Contemporary Review, 79; 188, London, 1901.
- Smith, G. B., "Causes of Anti-foreign Feeling in China"
North American Review, 171; 182, Boston, 1900.

B. Secondary Works.

- Bashford, J. W., China an Interpretation, New York, 1916.
- Clements, P. H., The Boxer Rebellion, New York, 1915.
- Colquhoun, A. R., China in Transformation, London, 1899.
- Coolidge, A. C., The United States as a World Power, New York, 1912.
- Douglas, R. K., History of China, New York, 1899.
- Fish, C. R., American Diplomacy, New York, 1916.
- Foster, J. W., American Diplomacy in the Orient, Boston and New York, 1904.
- Hart, A.B., American History told by Contemporaries, Vol.IV (1845-1900) New York, 1903.
- Hart, A. B., The American Nation: A History, Vol. 25. New York and London, 1907.
- Hayes, J. H., A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, Vol.I,II, New York, 1917.
- Huc Evarists Regis The Chinese Empire, Vol. I, II, London, 1855.
- Ireland, Allegue, China and the Powers, London, 1902.
- Johnston, W.F., American Foreign Relations, Vol. I, II, New York, 1916.
- Knox, P. C., Spirits and Purpose of the American Diplomacy, New York, 1910.
- Krausse, A. S., The Far East, London, 1903.
- Lalourette, K.S., The Development of China, New York, 1917.
- Lorenzo, Sears, John Hay Author and Statesman, New York, 1914.
- Millard, T.T., America and the Far East Question, New York, 1909.
- Millard, T. T., Our Eastern Question, New York, 1916.

- Millard, T. T., The New Far East, New York, 1906.
- Moore, J. B., A Review of Our Foreign Relations in the Far
East, Boston, 1899.
- Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy, New York and London, 1905.
- Smith, A. H., China and America Today, New York, 1907.
- Thayer, W. R., The Life and Letters of John Hay, Boston and
New York, 1912.
- Von Schierbrand, Wolf, America, Asia and the Pacific, New York, 1904.
- Williams, F. W., Anson Burlingame, New York, 1912.
- Wu Ting Fang, Mutual Helpfulness between China and the United
States, Washington, 1901.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA



3 0112 086833016